This is also true for the history of what is known in English as the Great North-China
Famine of 1876-1879 and in Chinese as the Dingwu qihuang 丁戊奇荒 or the Extraordinary Famine of the Years 1877 and 1878, of which the drought and famine in China's northwest discussed here forms a part. In those years large parts of North China were struck by a protracted drought. The extent and progression of that event are clearly shown in a series of maps in a recent climatological study: it started in eastern China with the core in Shandong province and moved on to cover most of central north China, in particular southern Shanxi, northern Henan and then further west to the Guanzhong region in Shaanxi, finally reaching Gansu in the Northwest. 7 At the time, the affected area was estimated at 650,000 km 2 by a British consular official, threatening the livelihoods of about 60 to 80 million people. perspective, focusing on government relief in all of the five mainly affected provinces. 10 Then, since the 1990s an ever growing number of studies on this subject have been published.
Just to mention the monographs: Zhu Hu examined the changes in the organization of private relief in the Jiangnan region; Takahashi Kōsuke wrote a social history of famine relief in the nineteenth century that also focuses on the work of Jiangnan philanthropists in the famine regions in the north, in particular Henan; Kathryn Edgerton-Tarpley studied 'cultural responses' to the famine with a focus on Shanxi province; and Hao Ping published another monograph-length study on famine relief in Shanxi. 11 Yet, despite these efforts by Qing historians, the Great North-China Famine is still not generally recognized as an important event in modern Chinese history -if textbooks can be considered an indication of this. Even the most recent ones rarely mention it, let alone discuss it in any detail. 12 The first to effectively bring what was perhaps the most deadly subsistence crisis of the early modern world to the attention of an audience that far exceeds the narrow circles of late Qing historians and to highlight its broader historical significance was not a China specialist but the leftist writer Mike Davis, who is best known for his critique of capitalist urban modernity. The first decades of the nineteenth century were characterized by extreme cold events and flooding, the latter particularly affecting people living close to the Wei River, as is 24 This is based on the 'Record of famine relief' in the provincial history of Shanxi (Shanxi tongzhi) compiled in the late nineteenth century, quoted in Andrea Janku, '"Heaven-sent Disasters" in Late How then is it possible to assess the relative severity of drought and famine conditions?
From 1830 onwards some of the records under examination here contain price data (cf. In the entire local history of Xianyang County (printed in 1932, i.e. more than five decades after the event) exactly 40 characters are devoted to the famine of those years:
In the third year of the Guangxu reign (1877) there was a great drought and no wheat harvest. One dou of wheat cost more than three strings of cash. People ate the bark of trees and the roots of wild grass, so that there was nothing left of it. Some even ate weathered rocks. They called it 'divine noodles.' Many died.
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Here it was the need to resort to 'famine foods,' and the fact that even those where exhausted what marked those years as particularly bad. Sanyuan is the only county in Xi'an prefecture with a local history that was compiled immediately after the famine. 29 But even though the preface evokes the desolate condition of the place when the scarcity of people and the abundance of uncultivated land are mentioned, 30 just 29 characters deal with the two years of drought:
In the third and fourth year of the Guangxu reign (1877-1878) there was a great drought in Shanxi, Henan and Shaanxi. In Sanyuan the price for one dou of wheat went up to 1700 to 1800 wen. Countless people died from hunger.
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Here the geographic extent of the drought is highlighted to show the severity of the ensuing disaster. As in the case of the Xianyang record, there is no mention of any relief. And as observed above, grain prices and the severity of disasters do not always correlate very well.
The Huazhou record laconically says:
1877. Great drought. Baiya Lake had dried out. Great famine. litres) for each person entitled to relief -hardly enough to survive for one month. But most importantly, government relief is mentioned only after the future existence of the entire community is seriously under threat -indicated by the loss of 'seeds' that here also has to be read metaphorically to include (male) descendants -and the occurrence of cannibalism. In brief, even though there were bad famine years that saw many people starve earlier in the century, neither resort to famine foods, a huge geographic extent of the disaster, or indeed cannibalism is mentioned in any of these earlier cases. One has to go back to the late Ming disasters to find similar accounts.
This first analysis sufficiently shows that while clusters of disasters and a few major crises can be clearly established, much of the data remains pretty meaningless without considering the more localized as well as the big events occurring at the same time, as well as the rationale compilers might have followed when they drafted the records or magistrates when they reported -or not -local disaster conditions. Even the major events remain hard to understand without a thorough investigation of the social, economic, and political context.
What seems to be obvious is that it was not the drought alone that turned the years 1877-8 into the major disaster that stands out from all the other crises experienced under Qing rule by Conspicuously, in this sample of sources there is only one case where private relief aid is mentioned. In 1892, when Xianyang's harvest was destroyed by insect pests, the record tells of one Liu Guyu 劉古愚 who contributed 100 liang to fight the food crisis. Guyu is the sobriquet (hao 號) of Liu Guangfen, to whom we now turn.
An insider's perspective: Liu Guangfen
Liu Guangfen was a juren of 1875 and one of the most outstanding representatives of Guanxue of his time. He was the only Qing scholar from Xianyang who was honoured with a biography in the chapter on 'famous scholars' (ming ru 名儒) in Xianyang's local history.
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With the exception of one trip to Beijing in 1876 to participate -without success -in the national examinations, he spent his entire life in Shaanxi and Gansu, where he held various teaching positions, first in the families of better-off acquaintances, then in various academies.
In the 1890s he became a fervent promoter of modernising reforms. After the Sino-Japanese Curiously enough, the famine is hardly ever mentioned by his biographers. 39 What was important however was the experience of the violence that erupted in 1862. It was this civil war in the course of which entire villages were massacred that was recorded as something that left a mark in Liu's biography and also in the local history -not the famine.
According to his biography, Liu, who lost his father as an infant, survived the violence of these years as a young adult hiding away in a place in the mountains, 'grinding broken wheat by night and selling pancakes by day,' always carrying books with him, which he recited whenever possible, regardless of being ridiculed. 40 This pattern is repeated in Xianyang's local history, which has only a few words on the famine, but a far more detailed account of the Hui rebellion. 43 Apparently, poverty and hunger were part of the everyday, and -importantly -part of the everyday of the poorer strata of the population. By the late 1870s this might have been relatively removed from his own experience, despite the hardship he had experienced growing up in relative poverty and a serious threat to his livelihood during the crisis of 1868, when -according to his own testimony -he and his family only escaped the hunger due to the generosity of one of his better-off friends, 44 just before he became a funded student (linsheng 廩生) in 1869. 45 It seems that the massacres were more likely to have had a traumatizing quality. At least they were far more likely to be documented. Thus in summary it can be said that in the local memory the deep wound left by the war between Han and Hui is clearly visible and kept alive, whereas the drought and famine is hardly ever mentioned, remained unspeakable. This is even more obvious when we look at the local history of Sanyuan published in 1880, when the experience of the famine was still fresh. As mentioned above, it has a 29-character-long record of the famine, mentioning the death of 'countless people.' It also has a terrifying, densely printed, six pages long list with the names of the victims -not of the famine, but of this other catastrophe that happened a decade earlier. 46 The famine victims remain nameless.
There is no space for them next to those heroic martyrs.
But does this mean that they were not important and that their deaths were without consequences? Reading about Liu Guangfen's commitment to famine relief in the minor crisis of 1892 we may wonder how he experienced the major crisis in 1877. The only trace of 43 Chongxiu Xianyang xianzhi, j.8: 9a-10b. 44 Liu writes about this in his epitaph for his friend Wang Yinong. This is also where he acknowledges the commitment of his senior friend who was asked to work for the official relief efforts in Xi'an in 1877. 'Wang weng Yinong muzhiming' 王翁益農墓誌銘, in Xianxia caotang wenji, j.4: 18a. 45 Liu Guyu nianpu, 21. 46 'Za ji,' in Sanyuan xianzhi, j.8: 6a-11b.
this crisis I could so far discover is a short passage in an epitaph co-authored by his fellowprovincial and reformer Song Bolu (1854-1932):
In the fall of 1877 the rains failed. There was great famine in Shaanxi. he never talked about private affairs to others. He only cared about the country. 48 His reaction to the famine may be explained similarly. Somehow, famine was also an internal issue that should not be exposed to outside criticism. His distress upon learning about the defeat of 1895, however, that made him weep all night, was perfectly gentlemanlike and patriotic and could therefore be mentioned. 49 His philanthropic response to the local crisis in 1892 can be understood as a well-established way of a privileged member of the gentry to give something back to society. But at the same time it could have been related to his experience in the earlier crisis and a desire to contribute to the general improvement of social conditions. Only after the political reform movement received a powerful boost through the defeat in the SinoJapanese war in 1895 however, was he able to translate the insights he had gained from his 47 Li Yuerui and Song Bolu, 'Liu Guangfen muzhiming,' in Chongxiu Xianyang xianzhi, j. intensive studies of the Classics and the painful experience of life in his native Guanzhong into political action.
When he explained his motivation the experience of hunger only seems to have been a minor factor. He hoped to solve the conflicts between Han and Hui in the frontier regions through the education system, 50 and to 'restore the past glory of Bin' (i.e. Shaanxi)' and thus start the project to save China from her poverty and inferiority from the northwest.
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Essentially this argumentation is a variation of the familiar self-strengthening rhetoric. But the explicit mentioning of the problem of poverty rather than just military weakness points to the possibility that his views may have been at least as much inspired by his direct experience of the famine of 1877 and earlier ones as by his indirect experience of military defeat, if not more so. Therefore it seems to me that the relative silence about a catastrophe that was so severe that in some cases it was marked by mentioning cannibalism in local histories is a talking silence. The massacres of 1862 were traumatizing, but there was a clearly identifiable image of an enemy. But who could be blamed for survival cannibalism?
An outsider's perspective: Wang Yong
It has been said about the famine in Shaanxi that 'the rich became poor and the poor died.' there were hardly any survivors. 53 The apportioning of demographic loss to either the rebellion or the famine seems to be a difficult issue for historical demographers. Their conclusions based on the available data for Xi'an prefecture are as follows: Jingyang County lost 62.1% of its population through warfare, hunger and epidemics in the 1860s. The further loss of population in the famine a decade later amounted to 17.3%. 54 In Gaoling, too, the number of 3000 men and women who are reported to have died in the famine is tiny if compared to the victims of the rebellion: here the ratio is 15.6% loss in the famine versus 60% loss through warfare and its consequences. 55 In Sanyuan however, where we saw that the famine was more or less ignored in the local history, whereas the war was one of the dominating events, the statistics look different. Here the loss of population through warfare in the 1860s has been calculated at 57.1%. Liuminji or 'Records of displaced people.' Thus contrary to the large majority of sources on the famine of 1877-1878, this text was not produced as a fund-raising pamphlet and its author was not involved in famine relief either. His perspective is that of an outsider, a chance observer of a terrible tragedy, and his intention was no more and no less than to save what he had witnessed from oblivion, and also to make it serve as a warning for the future. 57 Thus his text could also be read as a morality tract. What made the situation so extraordinary was that the harm also reached the scholarly class, and it did so in great numbers. Wang reports that the elders in Guanzhong considered the famine the worst calamity (第一奇劫) in more than 200 years -after the rebellion. This means that while locals thought that the famine was comparable to the late-Ming disasters, the rebellion was even worse. 60 Unfortunately he does not say what their criteria for this judgement were.
Apart from the many heart-breaking stories illustrating the day-to-day struggle of survival at the individual level, one of the most interesting aspects of this source is the new perspective it adds to the familiar accounts of the famine. Wang Yong wrote in a genre that made it possible to document what Liu Guangfen might have found unspeakable. Or one could assume that for Liu -who had grown up in relative poverty, had survived a famine thanks to the generosity of a wealthy friend, had witnessed the 1877-1878 disaster, and had made a major contribution to local private relief in 1892 -the famine was just an ordinary event, perhaps a bit more serious than the common poverty and malnutrition, but still just a manifestation of the overall poverty and weakness of his country, which he frequently deplored in his reform writings. But still, all the evidence shows that the famine was an unprecedented disaster, a terrible tragedy, in no way less unsettling than the massacres that wiped out entire villages during the rebellion or indeed the humiliation of the imperialist wars that happened far away at the other end of the empire. For whatever reason, it was easier to write about the humiliation inflicted by cultural others and foreign powers than about the humiliation inflicted by the lack of food. Therefore the writings of Liu and his colleagues tended to cast everything in the language of resistance to foreign aggression that if it had not created China's poverty and weakness, at least it had brought it to light, had taken advantage of it, and therefore required some kind of response. In a way, this is not too far away from Davis's argument. Still, there is a different side to it.
Arguably, one could say that in terms of the drought the situation in 1877-1878 was not significantly different from earlier crises (notably the one in 1720-1721, when the resources the state was able to mobilize were much larger than would be the case one and a half centuries later), but that it was due to an over-extension of empire that since the financial crisis in the late eighteenth century the Qing state could not fulfil its obligations towards the people; that compared to other nineteenth-century crises the famine in Shandong was not as exceptional as missionary relief workers presented it, meaning that we are not looking at a crisis that simply follows the movement of drought, but also at a crisis that is the result of the accumulation of various types of disasters over time; that the huge death toll in Shanxi was as the time of the new imperialism in the late nineteenth century. 67 The question remains whether changes in the economic structure of the affected areas following the Opium Wars of the mid-century had an impact on the ability to cope with the consequences of drought in 1877-8 and later. It appears that the major shift to cotton production in Guanzhong only happened after 1900, and that opium cultivation in the Wei River valley started only after 1870, 68 i.e. after or probably triggered by the protracted crises that haunted the area from the early 1860s and the famine in 1865 reported by Wang Yong, all of which together with the civil war increased the disaster vulnerability of communities. This chronology suggests that the new imperialism reinforced and probably superseded a process that had already been well underway.
The question is thus also about the impact of the responses of 'authoritarian governments.' To speak with Amartya Sen: 'It is an illustrative book of the disastrous consequences of fierce economic inequality combined with a drastic imbalance of political voice and power. The late-Victorian tragedies exemplify a wider problem of human insecurity and vulnerability related, ultimately, to economic disparity and political disempowerment.' 69 And this is not a problem of liberal capitalism alone.
